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Thispaperstudiestheeﬀectonmonetarypolicyofanon-homogeneousdegreeofcompe-
tition across the (two) members of a monetary union. In particular, we assess the welfare
loss brought about by the use of a simple interest rate rule that does not take into account
such structural diﬀerences. Our results show that, ceteris paribus, the welfare-maximizing
central bank should react more aggressively to the inﬂation pressure generated by the
more competitive economy. We extend the results of Benigno (2003) in two ways. First,
we show that, if the degree of competition diﬀers across countries, the optimal rule could
involve a larger weight on the more ‘ﬂexible’ country. Second, we allow for a non-unit-
elastic demand for import. We show that this can alter Benigno’s results even under a
symmetric degree of competition. Our study suggests that the size of the welfare losses due
to the neglect of these asymmetries crucially depends on their actual combination. Fur-
thermore, we show that if information on the true extent of the asymmetries is incomplete,




The creation of the European Monetary Union has raised new challenges for the European
policy makers. The European Central Bank (ECB) is now in charge of the monetary policy
for the (currently) twelve members of the monetary union. A single interest rate is now set
by the central bank in response to the inﬂationary pressures that stem from these twelve
countries. This fact opens the question as to how a single monetary policy can be designed
to respond to the – potentially idiosyncratic – inﬂation disturbances. The optimal design
of a single monetary policy could be heavily complicated by the existence of diﬀerences in
the functioning of the twelve economies.
A number of recent papers have addressed the question of the optimal design of a
monetary policy rule in an “asymmetric” currency area. The present paper contributes to
this literature by looking at the optimal response of the single interest rate to the inﬂation
pressure that stems from two hypothetical countries that form a monetary union.
In particular, we look at two sources of asymmetry across countries, although we
suggest that similar results are bound to emerge in the presence of other cross-country
diﬀerences. The ﬁrst asymmetry consists of a diﬀerent degree of nominal rigidity in the
prices for goods. That is, we assume that price adjustments are not synchronized across
ﬁrms and, furthermore, on average the prices adjust more quickly in one country than in
the other. If the central bank is concerned about the welfare of the members of the union
(as assumed in our paper), an infrequent and asynchronous adjustment of the prices will
be seen as detrimental, per se: the allocation of production is no longer dictated by the
relative eﬃciency of production but rather by the diﬀerent pace of price adjustments. The
central bank will counter this by eliminating the reason for price changes, i.e. by pursuing
a zero inﬂation policy. Yet, if the average speed of price adjustment varies across countries,
diﬀerent anti-inﬂationary policies would be recommended for each country. Since this is
not feasible under a single monetary policy, the best policy of the central bank should
be to react more strongly to the inﬂation pressure that originates from the country with
less ﬂexible prices. In practical terms this amounts to giving relatively more weight to
the inﬂation component that originates from the the “less ﬂexible” country. This policy
rule would yield a larger level of welfare compared to a rule that weights the inﬂation
components simply by the size of the country (as done in the HICP measure of inﬂation
used by the ECB).
This problem has already been addressed in the literature which also provided this
“reasonable” policy prescription. However, we show that this recommendation is sensi-
tive to some crucial aspects of the models used. In particular, we show that the trade
interactions between the members of the union, as well as the type of ﬁnancial markets
that operate in the union, might alter these results. It is shown that the dynamics of the
components of aggregate inﬂation that can be ascribed to each single country are sensitive
to the degree of price rigidity in those countries. The more rigid the prices, the smaller
the reaction of inﬂation to shocks. So, while on the one hand inﬂexible prices are detri-
mental for welfare because they bring about an ineﬃcient allocation of output, inﬂexible
prices tend to mitigate the response of inﬂation to shocks. Furthermore, we show that the
sensitivity of inﬂation to the degree of price rigidity increases with the elasticity of thecurrent account with respect to the countries’ relative prices. We show that if the foreign
demand is suﬃciently sensitive to the terms of trade, it is optimal for ﬁrms to adjust prices
only in small amounts so that the moderating eﬀect of the nominal rigidity on inﬂation
will outweigh (in welfare terms) the distortional eﬀects of price rigidity. This result was
missing in the related literature due to the assumption of a constant trade balance typical
made in this type of models.
The second source of asymmetry that we consider consists of diﬀerences in the degree
of competition in the market for goods. Standard microeconomic theory suggests that
welfare and degree of competition are positively correlated: perfect competition being the
best scenario and perfect monopoly being the worst. Nevertheless, in a dynamic general
equilibrium model with staggered price adjustments, the degree of competition has a
“second best” quality. This can be seen by looking at the eﬀect of a symmetric (positive)
productivity shock. The ﬁrms that happen to adjust their price in the period of the shock
will reduce their price to match the reduction in the cost of production, while the other
ﬁrms are assumed to leave their price unchanged (despite having experienced the same
change in costs of production). The demand for the diﬀerent goods will “switch” from
the latter group of ﬁrms to the former in proportion to the elasticity of substitution. The
smaller this elasticity (small degree of competition) the smaller the “switching” and hence
the smaller the ineﬃcient reallocation of production. Due to this eﬀect (and other things
equal) the central bank should react more aggressively to the inﬂation pressure coming
from the “more competitive” economy. In order to fully understand this result, the reader
should notice that (in our model) the central bank is unable to aﬀect the average degree
of competition. Hence, the proposed rule should not be seen as aimed at reducing the
degree of competition. The latter lies outside the realm of monetary policy.
When both asymmetries are present, it could be that the central bank reacts more
aggressively to the inﬂation pressure coming from the country with more ﬂexible prices, if
the latter’s market for goods is suﬃciently more competitive. We also show that ambiguous
outcomes emerge when the central bank has an incomplete information regarding the type
and extent of the asymmetries. In particular a symmetric response to inﬂation (` a la HICP)
is not necessarily sub-optimal even in the presence of structural asymmetries.
Finally, we tentatively quantify the welfare losses that would be produced by a sym-
metric rule in the face of structural asymmetries. The quantiﬁed losses, as well as the
uncertainty about the actual size and nature of the asymmetries, suggest that the sym-
metric approach (` a la HICP) might be close to the ﬁrst best. Nevertheless, a precise
estimation of these losses requires further empirical investigation.Zusammenfassung
Die Gr¨ undung der europ¨ aischen W¨ ahrungsunion stellt die geldpolitischen Instanzen Eu-
ropas vor neue Aufgaben. F¨ ur die Geldpolitik der (derzeit) zw¨ olf Mitgliedstaaten der
W¨ahrungsunionistjetztdieEurop¨aischeZentralbank(EZB)zust¨andig.DieZentralbank
setzt nun einen einheitlichen Zinssatz fest, mit dem sie auf den Inﬂationsdruck aus diesen
zw¨ olf L¨ andern reagiert. Dies wirft die Frage auf, wie eine einheitliche Geldpolitik beschaﬀen
sein muss, damit sie den - potenziell idiosynkratischen - inﬂaton¨ aren St¨ orungen wirksam
begegnen kann. Die optimale Ausgestaltung einer einheitlichen Geldpolitik k¨ onnte durch
die vor-handenen Unterschiede in der Funktionsweise der zw¨ olf Volkswirtschaften erheblich
erschwert werden.
Eine Reihe neuerer Forschungsbeitr¨ age befasst sich mit der Frage der optimalen Aus-
gestaltung einer geldpolitischen Regel in einem ”asymmetrischen“ W¨ ahrungsraum. Auch
der vorliegende Aufsatz leistet hier einen Beitrag, indem er untersucht, wie der einheitliche
Zinssatz optimal auf den Inﬂationsdruck aus zwei gegebenen L¨ andern, die eine W¨ ahrungs-
union bilden, reagiert.
Wir werden insbesondere zwei Ursachen f¨ ur Asymmetrien unter den L¨ andern betrach-
ten, gehen aber davon aus, dass andere Unterschiede zwischen den Staaten zu ¨ ahnlichen
Ergebnissen f¨ uhren. Die erste Art der Asymmetrie besteht darin, dass die G¨ uterpreise
einen unterschiedlichen Grad an nominaler Rigidit¨ at aufweisen. Wir nehmen also an, dass
Preisanpassungen von Unternehmen zu Unternehmen nicht gleichzeitig durchgef¨ uhrt wer-
den und dass die Preise zudem in einem Land schneller angepasst werden als in dem
anderen. Wenn der Zentralbank am Wohlstand der Teilnehmer an der W¨ ahrungsunion
gelegen ist (wie in unserem Beitrag unterstellt), wird eine seltene und asynchrone Anpas-
sung der Preise per se als Nachteil betrachtet: die Allokation der Produktion wird nicht
mehr durch die relative Produktionseﬃzienz bestimmt, sondern durch das unterschied-
liche Tempo der Preisanpassungen. Die Zentralbank wird dem begegnen, indem sie den
Grund f¨ ur die Preis¨ anderungen beseitigt, d. h. sie wird eine Politik der Null-Inﬂation ver-
folgen. Wenn aber die durchschnittliche Geschwindigkeit, mit der die Preise angepasst
werden, von Land zu Land abweicht, w¨ are f¨ ur jeden Staat eine andere anti-inﬂation¨ are
Politik angezeigt. Da dies im Rahmen einer einheitlichen Geldpolitik nicht m¨ oglich ist,
w¨ are das beste Vorgehen der Zentralbank, st¨ arker auf den Inﬂationsdruck aus dem Land
mit den weniger ﬂexiblen Preisen zu reagieren. Praktisch l¨ auft dies darauf hinaus, der
Inﬂationskomponente des Landes mit den weniger ﬂexiblen Preisen relativ mehr Gewicht
beizumessen. Diese Regel w¨ urde zu einem h¨ oheren Wohlstandsniveau f¨ uhren als eine Re-
gel, die die Inﬂations-komponenten lediglich nach der L¨ andergr¨ oe gewichtet (wie bei der
von der EZB verwendeten HVPI-Inﬂation).
Dieses Problem wurde bereits in der einschl¨ agigen Literatur behandelt, von der auch
dieses ”vern¨ unftige“ geldpolitische Rezept stammt. Wir weisen allerdings nach, dass diese
Empfehlung stark von einigen zentralen Aspekten der verwendeten Modelle beeinﬂusst
wird. Wir zeigen vor allem, dass die Handelsbeziehungen zwischen den Mitgliedern der
W¨ ahrungsunion sowie auch die Art der darin vorhandenen Finanzm¨ arkte diese Ergebnisse
ver¨ andern k¨ onnten. Es wird zudem deutlich, dass die Dynamik der Komponenten der
aggregierten Inﬂation, die jedem einzelnen Land zugeschrieben werden kann, auf den Gradder Preisrigidit¨ at in diesen L¨ andern reagiert. Je starrer die Preise sind, desto weniger
reagiert die Inﬂation auf Schocks. W¨ ahrend demnach inﬂexible Preise dem Wohlstand
einerseits abtr¨ aglich sind, weil sie eine ineﬃziente Produktionsallokation mit sich bringen,
haben sie andererseits tendenziell die Neigung, die Reaktion der Inﬂation auf Schocks abzu-
schw¨ achen. Wir legen dar¨ uber hinaus dar, dass die Sensitivit¨ at der Inﬂation gegen¨ uber dem
Grad der Preisrigidit¨ at mit der Elastizit¨ at der Leistungsbilanz in Bezug auf die relativen
Preise des Landes zunimmt. Auerdem zeigen wir auf, dass es f¨ ur Unternehmen, wenn
die Auslandsnachfrage hinreichend stark von den Terms of Trade beeinﬂusst wird, am
besten ist, ihre Preise nur in kleinen Schritten anzupassen, sodass die abschw¨ achende
Wirkung der nominalen Rigidit¨ at auf die Inﬂation gr¨ oer ist als die verzerrenden Eﬀekte
der Preisrigidit¨ at (im Hinblick auf den Wohlstand). Diese Erkenntnis fehlte bislang in der
entsprechenden Literatur, da diese Modelle zumeist von der Annahme einer konstanten
Handelsbilanz ausgehen.
Die zweite Ursache f¨ ur Asymmetrien, die wir untersuchen, liegt in einem unterschiedli-
chen Wettbewerbsgrad am G¨ utermarkt begr¨ undet. Die klassische mikro¨ okonomische Theo-
rie geht davon aus, dass Wohlstand und Wettbewerbsgrad positiv miteinander korre-
lieren. Dabei gilt vollst¨ andiger Wettbewerb als g¨ unstigster, ein absolutes Monopol als
ung¨ unstigster Fall. In einem dynamischen allgemeinen Gleichgewichtsmodell mit zeitlich
gestaﬀelten Preisan-passungen ist der Wettbewerbsgrad dessen ungeachtet nur zweitran-
gig. Dies wird ersichtlich, wenn man die Auswirkungen eines symmetrischen (positiven)
Produktivit¨ ats-schocks betrachtet. Unternehmen, die ihren Preis zuf¨ alligerweise in der
Zeit des Schocks ¨ andern, werden ihren Preis senken, um ihn an die niedrigeren Produkti-
onskosten anzupassen, w¨ ahrend die anderen Unternehmen ihren Preis unver¨ andert lassen
(obwohl sie von derselben nderung der Produktionskosten betroﬀen sind). Die Nachfrage
nach den verschiedenen G¨ utern verschiebt sich proportional zur Substitutionselastizit¨ at
von der zweiten Gruppe von Unternehmen zur ersten. Je geringer die Elastizit¨ at (ge-
ringer Wettbewerbsgrad), desto geringer die Verschiebung und desto geringer damit die
ineﬃziente Umverteilung der Produktion. Aufgrund dieses Eﬀekts (bei ansonsten gleichen
Bedingungen) sollte die Zentralbank aggressiver auf den Inﬂationsdruck aus der wettbe-
werbsintensiveren Volks-wirtschaft reagieren. Zur Erl¨ auterung dieses Ergebnisses weisen
wir darauf hin, dass die Zentralbank (in unserem Modell) nicht in der Lage ist, den durch-
schnittlichen Wettbewerbsgrad zu beeinﬂussen. Die vorgeschlagene Regel sollte deshalb
nicht in dem Sinn miverstanden werden, dass die Zentralbank den Wettbewerbsgrad re-
duzieren will.
Wenn beide Asymmetrien gegeben sind, k¨ onnte es sein, dass die Zentralbank aggressi-
ver auf den Inﬂationsdruck aus dem Land mit den ﬂexibleren Preisen reagiert, falls dessen
G¨ utermarkt hinreichend st¨ arker wettbewerbsorientiert ist. Zu uneindeutigen Ergebnissen
kann es kommen, wenn der Zentralbank unvollst¨ andige Informationen ¨ uber Art und Ausma
der Asymmetrien vorliegen. Insbesondere muss eine symmetrische Reaktion auf Inﬂation
(wie beim HVPI) selbst bei strukturellen Asymmetrien nicht automatisch suboptimal sein.
Abschlieend quantiﬁzieren wir n¨ aherungsweise den Wohlstandsverlust, den eine symme-
trische Regel bei strukturellen Asymmetrien mit sich bringen w¨ urde. Die quantiﬁzierten
Verluste wie auch die Unsicherheit ¨ uber das tats¨ achliche Ausma und die Art der Asym-
metrien l¨ asst den Schluss zu, dass der symmetrische Ansatz (wie beim HVPI) nahe amOptimum liegen k¨ onnte. Eine genaue Sch¨ atzung dieser Verluste bedarf allerdings weiterer
empirischer Untersuchungen.Contents
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the eﬀect on monetary policy of a non-homogeneous degree of compe-
tition and a non-homogeneous degree of nominal rigidity across members of a monetary
union. In particular, we assess the welfare losses brought about by the use of a simple
monetary policy rule that does not take into account such structural diﬀerences.2
The creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) has stimulated new research in
the theoretical aspects of the design of a monetary policy for a currency area. For example,
Benigno (2003) has shown that the stabilization policy of a welfare-maximizing central
bank should take into account diﬀerences in the degree of nominal rigidity across the
countries participating in the monetary union. The reason why non-homogeneous degrees
of price ﬂexibility could be of concern for the monetary authority of the union is that
these diﬀerences produce diﬀerences in the path of producers’ inﬂation and, ultimately,
diﬀerences in the degree of (ineﬃcient) ‘output dispersion’ (Woodford (2003) and Khan
et al. (2000)). In our paper we show that a similar type of ineﬃcient output dispersion
can be brought about by diﬀerent degrees of imperfect competition even when the degree
of nominal rigidity is identical across countries.
We show that the benevolent central bank of a monetary union should respond more
aggressively to the inﬂation pressure coming from the more competitive economy, other
things being equal. The rationale for this result is simple and parallels Benigno’s result
that the central bank should react more aggressively to the inﬂation generated in the
country with less ﬂexible prices. When prices are set in a staggered fashion, the amount
of ‘output dispersion’ generated by a given deviation of prices from their average depends
positively on the elasticity of substitution between goods (i.e. the degree of competition
in our model). Therefore, the country with the largest degree of competition is the one
that generates the greatest cost of inﬂation.
Our paper also extends the results of Benigno (2003) by ﬁnding that the optimal
interest rule should react more aggressively to the more ‘ﬂexible’ economy when the latter
is suﬃciently more competitive than the less ﬂexible economy. Furthermore, by allowing
the degree of substitutability between imported and domestic goods to diﬀer from one, we
show that (even under a symmetric degree of competition) the optimal rule could involve
a relatively larger weight on the more ‘ﬂexible’ country. The rationale of this result lies in
1I wish to thank colleagues at the Bundesbank for their comments. I also wish to thank Thomas Werner,
Leo von Thadden, Alan Sutherland, Huw Dixon, Robert Kollmann and Roel Beetsma for their suggestions
and comments. I assume full responsibility for any remaining errors. This paper reﬂects the author’s
personal views and does not necessarily reﬂect the views of the Deutsche Bundesbank. Correspondence:
Deutsche Bundesbank, Economic Research Centre, Frankfurt am Main, D-60431 - Germany. E-mail:
Giovanni.Lombardo@bundesbank.de. Tel.: ++49-69-95662382. Fax: ++49-69-95663082
2For example, the European Central Bank uses a measure of inﬂation (the euro-area HICP) that weights
the individual countries’ inﬂation by their consumption shares (see Table 4.1 of the Methodological Notes
of the ECB Monthly Bulletin).
1the dynamics of inﬂation (i.e. in the Phillips curve). When prices are very sticky, inﬂation
does not vary very much. This eﬀect counterbalances the eﬀect that the degree of price
rigidity has on the cost of inﬂation (i.e. on the degree of output dispersion).
The extent of the welfare gains from optimally weighting inﬂation depends on the actual
combination of the various asymmetries. For example, it is likely that more competition
brings about more price ﬂexibility. In this case the eﬀect of competition highlighted in
this paper will tend to oﬀset the nominal rigidity eﬀect studied by Benigno (2003).3
A more general result of our paper is that imperfect competition, in a dynamic model
with sticky prices, should be seen in a diﬀerent way from the mere source of ‘Harberger
triangles’. In the presence of sticky prices it acquires a second-best quality: the less
competition, the smaller the negative welfare eﬀects of nominal price rigidity.
Our model modiﬁes Benigno’s two-country model by allowing the price elasticity of
the demand for goods, as well as the degree of nominal rigidity of prices, to diﬀer across
countries. Furthermore, we do not restrict the preferences for domestic and imported
goods to a Cobb-Douglas function. That is, we allow for current account imbalances. Like
Benigno (2003), we study the problem of monetary policy from a welfare point of view (` a
la Woodford (2003)). The objective of the benevolent policymaker consists of taking the
weighted average of the utility functions of the households living in the monetary union.
The rest of the model is a typical New-Keynesian two-country model (e.g. Obstfeld and
Rogoﬀ (1995)) with staggered price-setting ` a la Calvo (1983).
Since in this paper we focus on the welfare cost of adopting a simple policy rule
that neglects the structural diﬀerences across the members of the monetary union, we
do not discuss the fully optimal rule.4 The problem of optimally weighting the ‘indicator
variables’ for monetary policy is a typical issue in the design of simple instrument rules (see
Svensson (1999), and Svensson and Woodford (2003)). Here we focus, in particular, on
the problem of aggregating the country-speciﬁc information on inﬂation when the degree
of competition diﬀers across countries.
From a technical point of view, our paper departs from the analysis of Benigno (2003)
and of Beetsma and Jensen (2002) in that we take a full second-order approximation of the
model in order to assess welfare.5 As explained in Woodford (2003), the linear-quadratic
solution to the policy problem is accurate only if the reduced-form welfare function does
not contain ﬁrst moments of the variables. In closed economy models this is generally the
case when the non-stochastic steady state, around which the model is approximated, is a
3From a theoretical point of view, there is no clear connection between price ﬂexibility and monopoly
power. Some empirical evidence seems to suggest that the intervals between price adjustments increase
with market concentration (e.g. Carlton (1986) and Powers and Powers (2001)).
4In an earlier version of this paper we followed more closely the work of Benigno and derived both
the optimal policy with commitment as well as the optimal Taylor-type rule (Lombardo, 2002a). The
approach followed here allows for a more compact and focused exposition besides requiring less restrictive
assumptions.
5Angelini et al. (2002) also consider the problem of monetary policy in an asymmetric currency area. Our
work is diﬀerent from their study in several respects. Our focus is mainly theoretical and is meant to extend
on existing works on monetary policy in a currency area with two speciﬁc asymmetries, i.e. competition
and the degree of nominal rigidity (Benigno (2003) and Beetsma and Jensen (2002)). Furthermore, the
solution technique adopted is diﬀerent.
2Pareto-eﬃcient equilibrium. In our two-country model this cannot be easily done. First,
we study welfare outcomes under diﬀerent degrees of competition. Imposing subsidies that
would oﬀset any existing degree of monopolistic distortion would make it harder to assess
the welfare implications of the degree of competition. Second, in this paper we relax
the assumption of a balanced current account in every period that is used in Benigno
(2003) and Beetsma and Jensen (2002). This implies that the welfare function depends
also on ﬁrst moments, so that a second-order approximation of the structural equations
is required. In this paper, for the sake of simplicity we assume that the two countries
can exchange assets only in the form of bonds. We leave for future research the task of
assessing the eﬀects of alternative ﬁnancial arrangements on welfare and monetary policy.
Following Sutherland (2001), we solve a ‘quadratic-quadratic’ policy problem. That is
to say, we take a second-order approximation of the structural equations of the model as
well as of the welfare function. This approach has been recently adopted by Sutherland
(2002) and by Lombardo and Sutherland (2003) in open economy models with prices
predetermined for one period.6
A number of other recent papers touch upon the relationship between imperfect com-
petition and monetary policy, although none (so far) has studied the problem in a non-
homogeneous currency area.
Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2001a) study the implication of diﬀerent degrees of compe-
tition for the optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy of a closed economy. They show that the
optimal inﬂation rate is positive. While the volatility of inﬂation decreases in the degree
of competition, the volatility of consumption increases, as we ﬁnd in our model. These
authors do not report the net eﬀect on welfare of the degree of competition.
Neiss (1999) studies the relationship between the degree of competition and the dis-
cretionary optimal inﬂation rate in a Barro-Gordon type of model. She shows that the
optimal inﬂation rate is a non-monotonic function of the degree of competition. As King
and Wolman (1999) show in a dynamic New-Keynesian model, the result obtained by
Neiss would emerge if the central bank had to commit itself to a constant inﬂation rate.
Without this commitment, the optimal inﬂation rate tends to zero asymptotically.
By introducing a welfare eﬀect of holding money, Khan et al. (2000) show that the
zero inﬂation result of King and Wolman (1999) does not hold. Instead, they ﬁnd that
a small deﬂation rate would be optimal. This deﬂation rate decreases in the degree of
competition. Following Benigno (2003), Beetsma and Jensen (2002), Woodford (2003)
and most of the recent New Open Economy literature (e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2002),
Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and Devereux and Engel (2001)), we abstract from these
monetary frictions.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 discusses the assumptions regarding the ﬁnancial market. Section 4 derives the objec-
tive of the policy maker and discusses the relationship between welfare, monetary policy
and diﬀerences in the degree of competition and in the degree of nominal rigidity across
6Recently, Benigno and Woodford (2003) have solved analytically an optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy
problem in a closed economy using a second-order approximation technique very similar to the one used
here. Given the objective of our paper, deriving the analytical solution to the policy problem would be
overly involved algebraically and with little beneﬁt in terms of intuition.
3countries. Section 5 presents the numerical results. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
We assume that the world economy consists of two countries (home country, H, and
foreign country, F). These countries share the same currency and hence the same monetary
authority. As described below, the two countries are entirely symmetric except for the
degree of nominal rigidity of goods prices and the degree of competition in the markets
for goods. The only stochastic disturbances are represented by uncorrelated productivity
shocks.
2.1 Preferences
Households in country H and country F have identical preferences over leisure, real money
balances and a bundle of consumption goods produced at home and abroad. This bundle

































where j = H;F and where (1 ¡ µ)¡1 is the elasticity of substitution between do-
mestically produced goods (henceforth denoted by "j) and (1 ¡ º)¡1 is the elasticity of
substitution between home and foreign goods (henceforth denoted by '). Furthermore,
µ = µH if j = H and µ = µF when j = F.





































Households supply a large variety of labour services, each speciﬁc to a ﬁrm producing
goods in their own country: i.e. labour is immobile across countries and ﬁrms (as in
Woodford (2003)).
7To save on notation, we show the time subscripts only when diﬀerent timing appears in the same
equation or when otherwise convenient.










where j = H;F.
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i is the market discount factor such that ¯ Rt;t = 1, Rs is the gross interest
rate on domestic assets, Is is the gross return on foreign assets (the policy instrument),
Mt is the money stock held by consumers, Bs is a nominal bond representing claims
on goods produced by the other country in the union, Ds is a domestic nominal bond
in zero net supply, ¿t is a lump-sum tax/transfer and yt (z) is total real output of the
z-th ﬁrm. l(z) is labour supply to the zth ﬁrm. Â is a weight on real balances in the
household objective. In fact, money is irrelevant in the present model since the monetary
authority uses the nominal interest rate as the policy instrument. In addition, we assume
in the welfare evaluation that Â is of negligible size so that we can abstract from the
real balance term in the consumer’s preferences (see Woodford (2003)). P(Bs¡1) is an
interest rate risk ‘premium’ that depends on the aggregate net foreign asset position of the
household’s country. This premium will eliminate the unit root in the trade balance that
would otherwise be induced by the presence of an international bond market. The role of
this premium in our model is discussed in more detail in section 3.
The implied ﬁrst order conditions relative to the choice of consumption, labour and























8A similar set of equations can be derived for country F.
5where
W(z)
P is the real wage paid by the zth ﬁrm, U (C) = (1 ¡ ¾)




A similar set of equations can be derived for the foreign country.
2.2 Firms
There are a large number of ﬁrms in the union, which we index on the unit interval. Of
these, n produce in country H and 1 ¡ n in country F. Each ﬁrm produces one type of
good with the result that there are as many goods as ﬁrms. Each item is an imperfect
substitute for the other goods, as indicated by the households’ preferences. Each ﬁrm uses
the same technology, that is (say for country H)
y (z) = AH f (l(z);k) = AH l(z)
1¡® ¯ k® (13)
where AH;t is a country-speciﬁc technology shock identical across ﬁrms within each coun-
try, l(z) is the speciﬁc labour input and ¯ k is any other factor (possibly capital) used in
production. We assume that these other factors are ﬁxed and normalized to one. This
functional form implies that ﬁrms face increasing marginal costs and this, in turn, induces
an eﬀect of the degree of competition on the degree of real rigidity of prices (see the
discussion in Kimball (1995) and Woodford (2003) and further below).
2.2.1 Calvo contracts
We assume that ﬁrms adjust prices only at random intervals, in accordance with the
mechanism described in Calvo (1983). That is, in any period of time there is a probability
! that the ﬁrm does not adjust the price.















where TC denotes total costs of production.













where j = H;F, where mc is the real marginal cost, ¹j = "j
"j¡1 is the mark-up and where
market clearing requires yt = ncH;t + (1 ¡ n)cF;t.



















where zH 2 [0;n]; and zF 2 (n;1] and sj ¸ 1 is a country-speciﬁc subsidy that, in
principle, could counter the monopolistic distortion.
62.3 Monetary policy
In this work we assess the welfare losses due to the adoption of inﬂation targeting rules (` a
la Taylor (1993) or Rotemberg and Woodford (1998)) when the country-speciﬁc inﬂation
components are weighted by the size of the countries without taking account of their
structural diﬀerences.
Following S¨ oderlind (1999), for a given vector of endogenous variables Xt such a simple
rule for the interest rate can be written as
It = ¯ f0Xt
where ¯ f is a conformable vector of parameters. The problem of ﬁnding an optimal simple
rule amounts to ﬁnding the elements of the vector ¯ f.
Thanks to the second-order solution method adopted in this paper, the elements of ¯ f
that maximize the welfare function to a second order of approximation can be obtained
by means of a solution algorithm for linear systems.
Within the family of simple rules, inﬂation targeting rules have gained particular at-
tention in recent years.9 This is also the focus of our paper.
Let us then deﬁne the vector of endogenous targets as Xt = [ˆ ¼H
t ; ˆ ¼F
t ]0, where a ˆ
on a variable denotes its log-deviation from the non-stochastic steady state. Extending
this vector to include the output gap would not alter our results regarding the optimal
weighting of inﬂation.
Further below we show that the optimal parameters ¯ f1 and ¯ f2 are generally not sym-
metric when the two countries’ degree of competition (or degree of nominal rigidity) diﬀers.
We then compare the performance of the optimal interest rate rule with the performance
of a rule that imposes symmetry. We also assume that the interest rule is inertial, i.e.
ˆ It = 0:9 ˆ It¡1 +¯ f0 Xt:
This assumption facilitates the numerical computation of the optimal weights without
aﬀecting our results.10
The central bank commits itself to follow the stated rule. This rule is implemented
by supplying the necessary quantity of money that clears the market. In each period the
following constraint holds for the central bank
Mt ¡ Mt¡1 = ¿t:
9See also Svensson (1999); Woodford (2003); Clarida et al. (2000). Somewhat in contrast to the taxon-
omy of rules suggested by Svensson (1999), here we call an inﬂation targeting rule a rule that (optimally
or not) links the nominal interest rate to the inﬂation rate: i.e. what Svensson calls an instrument rule.
10In order to obtain second moments we need a solution for the price level dynamics. It is well known that
an interest rate rule would not be suﬃcient to anchor the value of the price level: the nominal quantities
would display a unit root. While this is not relevant for welfare in our model, since the latter depends
on the inﬂation rate and not on the price level, it constitutes a problem for the derivation of the second
moments. As customary in interest rate rule models (e.g. Corsetti and Pesenti (2001)), we augment the
interest rate rule by a small feedback from the nominal producers’ prices (of magnitude 10
¡4).
72.4 Forcing process
Productivity shocks are the only stochastic shocks discussed in this paper. Productivity is
modelled like an AR(1) process, i.e. ˆ AH;t = ½H ˆ AH;t¡1 + ²H;t, where ²H;t is an iid(0;¾2
H).
A similar equation applies to the foreign country’s shock. Furthermore, we assume that
½H = ½F and ¾H = ¾F.
3 The international ﬁnancial market
In this paper we adopt the second-order approximation method of Sutherland (2001), to
solve the optimal policy problem as well as to evaluate the welfare loss due to a policy
rule that neglects the asymmetries of the two economies. This method amounts to taking
a second-order Taylor expansion of the welfare function (` a la Woodford (2003)), as well
as of the structural equations of the model, around the non-stochastic steady state. The
second-order approximation of the structural equations allows us to obtain ﬁrst moments
that are accurate to a second order of approximation. Therefore, in order to evaluate
welfare up to a second order of approximation (as done among others in Woodford (2003),
Benigno (2003), Beetsma and Jensen (2002) and Sutherland (2002)) we do not need to
impose eﬃciency of the non-stochastic steady state.11
In the general case of a CES aggregator of home and foreign consumption goods, the
international ﬁnancial market plays an important role since current account imbalances
will be ﬁnanced through international transfers of wealth. Obviously, there are various
ways in which the international ﬁnancial market can be modelled (see Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ
(1996, chap. 5)). For reasons of space it would not be possible to consider here the
implications of diﬀerent assumptions regarding the ﬁnancial market for the issue addressed
in this paper. Therefore, we restrict our attention to the case of a bond economy (as in
Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995)), where the two countries’ households can hold foreign assets
only in the form of bonds (as described by the budget constraint (8)).
It is well known that the assumption of trade in bonds brings about a unit root
(Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe, 2001b) in foreign assets and the trade balance. This fact is
problematic for the accuracy of the approximation of the model around the non-stochastic
steady state, since the economy is non-stationary around this equilibrium. Nevertheless, it
is well known that introducing a wedge between the interest rate faced by the two countries
can re-establish the uniqueness of the stationary equilibrium (Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe,
2003). This asymmetry can be produced by ﬁnancial market frictions: e.g. ‘iceberg’
transaction costs in the asset market. We follow this strategy in order to eliminate the non-
stationarity of our model economy (as in Lombardo (2002b)).12 For the sake of simplicity
we assume that the premium decreases in the aggregate net foreign asset position of each
country. That is, the domestic interest rate premium is not aﬀected by the decision of a
11This point was ﬁrst raised by Kim and Kim (2003). They show that the log-linearisation can bring
about spurious ‘welfare reversals’. See Woodford (2003, chap. 6) for a discussion of this problem.
12This ‘premium’ is generally calibrated so that its overall eﬀect on the dynamics of the system is
minimized. Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2003) discuss alternative ways to deal with this problem for the
case of small open economies. They show that these alternatives produce very similar results.
8single household.












where ½B is a constant that will be calibrated in order to eliminate the unit root in foreign
assets and where the subscript ss denotes steady-state values (see Appendix A).
The second-order approximation to the bond holding yields for the home country




















and a similar expression for the foreign country.13
4 Welfare
In this section we derive the second-order approximation to the household utility function.
This will be assumed to be the objective function of the benevolent central bank. Notice
ﬁrst that the aggregate of the labour supply in the utility function, together with the















































for the home country and a similar one for the foreign country (WF).
To a second-order approximation, the objective of the central bank of the currency
















. » is the vector of exogenous disturbances.
14The computation of second-order accurate conditional moments raises some numerical diﬃculties. For
the solution of these problems I beneﬁted from discussions with Alan Sutherland. Clearly any remaining
error would be my sole responsibility.
94.1 Inﬂation and welfare
It is convenient at this point to make explicit the relationship between inﬂation, output
dispersion and welfare.
For this purpose we need to take a second-order approximation of equation (20), i.e.
ˆ Xt = !Hb ˆ ¼H
















where b = "H ³+1
1¡®.
In the Appendix B we show that
ˆ pi;t ¡ ˆ PH;t =
!H































1 ¡ !H ˆ ¼H









Notice that to a ﬁrst-order approximation, the auxiliary variable ˆ Xt depends only
on its past value, i.e. it has no forcing process attached to it. Hence, to a ﬁrst-order
approximation it is constant over time. Its variance and its covariance with inﬂation are
zero. Therefore, we can rewrite equation (25) as
ˆ Xt =
"H (³ + 1)!H
2(1 ¡ !H)(1 ¡ ®)
µ














1 ¡ "H + "H ³+1
1¡®
´
is positive, the dispersion of output and, hence, the disutility
of labour increase with the variance of inﬂation. Importantly, this relationship is stronger
the smaller (1 ¡ ®), i.e. the smaller the share of labour in production. Furthermore, the
degree of competition and the degree of nominal rigidity interact in a complex way.
From equations (26), (19), (21) and (22) it should now be clear that the optimizing
central bank, in choosing the optimal rate of inﬂation in the two countries, will take into
account the relative degree of competition as well as the relative degree of nominal rigidity.




@!H > 0, the optimizing central bank – other things being





@"H > 0, the optimizing central bank – other things being equal – will react more
aggressively to the country with a more competitive domestic market.
Note, nevertheless, that the degree of competition and the degree of nominal rigidity
contribute to the determination of the dynamics of inﬂation and, hence, to its variance.
10To a second order of approximation the variance of inﬂation depends only on ﬁrst order
terms. Appendix C shows that the ﬁrst order approximation to the dynamic equation of
























where Át depends on home consumption and on the home productivity shock. The pa-
rameter ·3 depends on the size of the countries and decreases in "H if ' > 1.15 The other
key parameter in this equation is ·1 (see the Appendix). This parameter decreases in !H:
if prices do not vary at all, there cannot be any inﬂation. It also decreases in the degree
of competition (i.e. in "H). This eﬀect has been described by Kimball (1995). The more
competitive the market the larger the degree of real rigidity of prices: i.e. the ﬁrms that
adjust the price will do this by small amounts.16 These counteracting eﬀects of the degree
of competition and of the degree of nominal rigidity have implications for monetary policy.
We explore these numerically in the following sections.
5 Results: the case of ' = 1
In this section we study numerically the eﬀect on monetary policy and welfare of diﬀerent
degrees of competition and of nominal rigidity, under the assumption of ' = 1 (i.e. the
case studied in Benigno (2003) and Beetsma and Jensen (2002)). Welfare changes are
transformed into percentages of steady state consumption.17
In the ﬁrst subsection we consider the eﬀect of competition on welfare under the
optimal simple rule in a symmetric union. In the second subsection we measure the gains
from optimally weighting inﬂation when the degree of competition diﬀers across countries.
Finally, in the third subsection we extend the results of Benigno (2003) by showing the
combined eﬀect of diﬀerent degrees of competition and diﬀerent degrees of nominal rigidity
across countries on monetary policy and welfare.
Except for the parameters discussed in the following three subsections, we ﬁx the value
of some parameters to numbers that are within ranges used in the related literature (in
particular Benigno (2003) and Beetsma and Jensen (2002)). We set ¯ = 0:99; ¾ = 6;
³ = 2; and !H = !F = 0:5 unless diﬀerently speciﬁed. As for the labour share, 1 ¡ ®, we
follow Gal´ ı et al. (2001) by setting it equal to 0:75=¯ ¹ (unless diﬀerently speciﬁed), where
¯ ¹ = 1:15 is the benchmark value of the mark-up. The innovation to the productivity
shocks is assumed to have a variance of ¾2
H = ¾2
F = 0:01. Our welfare measures will be
proportional to this variance.
15More precisely, if ' > 1, ·3 decreases in the steady-state terms of trade. The latter increase in "
H (see
equation (31)).
16This fact has some empirical support. Carlton (1987), among others, provides some evidence of a
positive relationship between the degree of market concentration and the size of price adjustments.











c = 100% means that the equivalent loss (gain) in steady state consumption is zero.
11The degree of persistence of the productivity shock, besides co-determining the variance
of the technology shock, aﬀects welfare in a special way. The correlation between output
and the shock enters with a positive sign in the welfare function and is increasing in ½H
(see equation (19)). The household gains if the demand is high when the productivity is
high. Our main result is not qualitatively aﬀected by the value of the persistence of the
shocks so that we set it at ½H = 0:8.
Finally, we set the risk premium parameter ½B to 10¡6.
5.1 Competition and welfare under the optimal simple rule
In this section we study the eﬀect of the degree of competition on welfare as well as
on the optimal monetary policy. In order to isolate this eﬀect from the consequences of
asymmetric structures, we assign the same degree of competition and of nominal rigidity to
both countries. We further assume that there are no subsidies oﬀsetting the monopolistic
distortion (i.e. sH = sF = 1).
For convenience we redeﬁne the policy vector as ¯ f ´ af where f2 = (1¡f1) and a is a
constant. Under symmetry f1 = 0:5. Therefore, in this section we study the relationship
between the average elasticity of demand ("W ´ n"H +(1¡n)"F), welfare and the policy
parameter a.
Table (1) shows the optimal response to inﬂation as well as the welfare outcome for
diﬀerent deviations of the average elasticity from the benchmark case (i.e. "W = ∆"W +
7:66). The table shows that welfare decreases in the degree of competition.18 The table
also shows that the central bank reacts more strongly to inﬂation for larger average degrees
of competition. Both these results are consistent with the analytical description of the
relationship between inﬂation and welfare given in subsection 4.1.19
5.2 Gains from the optimal rule
In the previous section we saw that competition can indeed have a negative eﬀect on
welfare in a stochastic model with staggered price setting. In this section we turn to the
case of an asymmetric monetary union. In order to simplify the exposition of our results
we ﬁx the average degree of competition at "W = 7:66 which amounts to a mark-up of
15% (the value chosen by Beetsma and Jensen (2002)). We then study the relationship
between the optimal policy parameters (f) and the diﬀerence in the degree of competition
between the two countries (henceforth, "R ´ "F ¡ "H) as well as diﬀerences in the degree
of nominal rigidity (henceforth, !R ´ !H ¡ !R).
18One should recall that the magnitude of the welfare losses/gains is proportional to the variance of the
shocks. Furthermore, we abstract from the steady-state eﬀect of the monopolistic distortion on welfare
since in our model this cannot be aﬀected by the monetary policy (the focus of our paper). Nevertheless,
it is worth noting that under a suﬃciently small variance of the shocks (as must be assumed in our approx-
imated model) the steady-state ineﬃciency will unambiguously dominate, though with no consequences
for monetary policy.
19It is worth mentioning that the welfare function is rather ﬂat in the parameter a, so that there are no
big losses associated with rules ‘close’ to the optimal.
12First we note from Table (2) that welfare decreases in the diﬀerence between the
degree of competition in the home and foreign countries when the central bank neglects
the structural asymmetry (i.e. when it weights the country-speciﬁc measures of inﬂation
by the relative size of the countries and sets a to the optimal value for the symmetric
scenario). The reduction in welfare is not substantial. Nevertheless, it should be noted
that, under the optimal rule, welfare increases in the ‘competition gap’. This can be seen
by reading the ﬁrst column of Table (3). The reason for this result is that in a symmetric
currency area the central bank cannot control the terms of trade (as shown by Benigno
(2003)). The terms of trade in a symmetric two-country model depend (symmetrically) on
the developments of the two economies and vice versa. Since the central bank has only one
instrument, it can only aﬀect the two (identical) economies symmetrically. For example, if
the monetary authority induces an increase in the producers’ price in one country, it must
induce the same increase in the producers’ price level in the other country: The terms of
trade remain unaﬀected. By contrast, if the two countries diﬀer, so that for example an
increase in the nominal interest rate has diﬀerent eﬀects on the two countries’ price level,
the central bank can aﬀect the terms of trade. That the latter are relevant for welfare can
again be gauged by inspecting equation (19). Home production (and eﬀort) depends on
the demand for home goods. A change in the terms of trade shifts the demand (and the
burden of production) from one country to the other. Furthermore, the terms of trade
aﬀect the dynamics of inﬂation (equation (27)) If the central bank acquires some control
on the terms of trade, it can improve its inﬂuence on the determinants of welfare. The
gap between the performance of the symmetric rule and the performance of the optimal
rule widens in the degree of asymmetry. The relative loss associated with the symmetric
rule more than oﬀsets the gain associated with the improved control of the terms of trade.
Equations (19) and (26) show that the disutility of labour eﬀort decreases in (1 ¡ ®).
Table (2) shows that this eﬀect can be quantitatively very large. From this result we can
infer that, were the returns to labour diﬀerent across countries, the central bank would
have a strong incentive to take into account this diﬀerence in responding to the county-
speciﬁc inﬂation rate. It is also clear that the correct assessment of the welfare eﬀects
of alternative monetary policies will depend on the correct assessment of this potential
source of asymmetry. For reasons of space we do not refer further to this aspect in this
work.
5.3 Two asymmetries: nominal rigidity and competition
The eﬀect on monetary policy of an asymmetric degree of nominal rigidity in a monetary
union is thoroughly studied in Benigno (2003). Here we suggest that diﬀerences in the
degree of competition could either exacerbate or oﬀset the eﬀect of an asymmetric degree
of nominal price rigidity. In which of these two directions the interaction goes depends on
the relationship between the degree of competition and the degree of nominal rigidity and
therefore remains an empirical issue upon which we touch brieﬂy further below.
We start ﬁrst by looking at the eﬀect on welfare of diﬀerent degrees of nominal rigidity
and diﬀerent degrees of competition when the central bank optimally chooses the interest
13rate rule parameters. Table (3) shows that welfare, under the optimal rule, increases
in both the gaps. As explained in the previous section, this is due to the fact that the
central bank’s control of the terms of trade increases in the degree of asymmetry of the
two economies.
The main result of our work is shown in Table (4). The entries correspond to the
optimal parameter f1 for various values of the ‘competition gap’ ("R) and of the ‘nominal
rigidity gap’ (!R). As !R increases, the home (foreign) country’s price ﬂexibility is reduced
(increased). As "R increases the home (foreign) country becomes less (more) competitive.
So, for example, according to the evidence provided by Carlton (1986) the two ‘gaps’
should move in the same direction. One can easily see that, for any given degree of
competition, f1 increases in the nominal rigidity gap. Similarly, for any given degree of
nominal rigidity, f1 decreases in the competition gap. In the table we have highlighted the
initial values of f1 equal or larger than 0.5: i.e. when monetary policy starts reacting more
aggressively to the home inﬂation. Strikingly, for suﬃciently wide competition gaps the
central bank should react more strongly (i.e. a coeﬃcient larger that 0.5) to the country
with less nominal rigidity. This result suggests that incomplete information about the
true economic structure of the ‘two’ economies might lead to the design of sub-optimal
instrument rules.
Table (5) shows this case in more detail. In this table we show, as an example, the
diﬀerence between the welfare function evaluated under a rule optimized only on the basis
of information regarding the degree of nominal rigidity and the welfare function evaluated
under a symmetric rule.20 As one would expect, when the degree of competition diﬀers
substantially across the two countries and the nominal rigidity gap is not too extreme,
the symmetric rule outperforms the optimal rule under incomplete information. We leave
for future research the study of rules for currency areas that are ‘robust’ to imperfectly
measurable asymmetries.
It is clear from Table (4) that the result in Benigno (2003) – that the less ‘ﬂexible’
countries should receive a larger weight in the policy rule – could be altered by a positive
relationship between price ﬂexibility and competition. For example, if we start from
!R = 0 and "R = 0, whether the optimal weight should increase or decrease as !R
increases, depends crucially on whether (and how quickly) "R increases or decreases.21
Owing to the very scant cross-country evidence on the degree of price rigidity and
on the degree of competition, it is diﬃcult to infer how large the gains from optimally
weighting inﬂation could be in reality, e.g. in the European Monetary Union. It would
be tempting to use labour market data on wage rigidity and unionization (e.g. Nickell
(1997)) as proxies for the degree of price rigidity and of competition in goods markets.22
20In the optimal rule, both a and f1 are chosen optimally. The symmetric rule uses values that are
optimal under symmetry.
21This result stresses the importance of micro-foundations. Our model, as is mostly the case in the
current macroeconomic literature, falls short of pinning down the endogenous determination of all the
agents’ decisions. For example, prices are set at exogenous random intervals and – the point at hand
– the frequency of price adjustments and the degree of competition are assumed to be independent and
exogenous.
22Benigno (2003) and Beetsma and Jensen (2002) use this evidence only as a proxy for the degree of
nominal price rigidity.
14Nevertheless, such a parallel runs the risk of being misleading, since the structure of
labour markets typically diﬀers markedly from the structure of the markets for goods.23
Instead, there is some evidence that the degree of price rigidity diﬀers signiﬁcantly across
sectors and that it is greater in less competitive sectors (e.g. Carlton (1987), Powers and
Powers (2001)). Furthermore, some evidence supports the conjecture that the degree of
price rigidity varies across countries within the same sector as well as across sectors (as
shown in Bils and Klenow (2002) and Hoﬀmann et al. (2003) for the USA and Germany
respectively). We take this evidence as suggestive of the existence of asymmetries in the
degree of nominal rigidity and in the degree of competition across countries, although it
is insuﬃcient to quantify these asymmetries.
Despite the lack of reliable measures of the degree of price rigidity and of the degree
of competition, we can gauge from Table (6) the order of magnitude of the welfare gains
from optimally weighting inﬂation. The table shows the diﬀerence between the welfare
change under the optimal weighting and that under the symmetric weighting for various
values of the relative degree of nominal rigidity and of the competition gap. Two important
results emerge from the graph. First, the relationship between welfare and nominal rigidity
diﬀerentials is monotone in the rigidity gap only if the competition gap is either very small
or very large. This result extends the analysis of Benigno (2003) in the sense that his work
focuses only on the ﬁrst row of Table (6). The non-monotonicity of welfare in the Calvo-
probability can be seen by looking at equation (26) and (27). The ﬁrst relationship (the
measure of the disutility of eﬀort), say for the home country, increases in !H. The square
of the second relationship determines the variance of home producers’ price inﬂation. From
the parameter ·1 we see that the variance of inﬂation decreases in !H. Hence, the overall
cost of inﬂation is potentially non-monotone in !H. From equation (27) one can also see
that the degree of substitutability between domestic and imported goods (') can amplify
the variance of inﬂation by strengthening the eﬀect of terms of trade variations on the
inﬂation rate. In the next section we explore this possibility.
A second and important result that can be drawn from Table (6) is that, at least
under our calibration, the welfare losses from a suboptimal weighting of inﬂation are not
negligible. Up to about 0:80% per quarter of steady state consumption could be lost due
to the adoption of a suboptimal rule.
6 Results: the case of ' 6= 1
So far we have studied the case of a Cobb-Douglas aggregator for domestic and foreign
goods. This is the case mostly studied in the literature, and in particular in Benigno
(2003) and Beetsma and Jensen (2002). Nevertheless, our solution technique allows us
to study the more general case of a CES aggregator. For reasons of space, though, we
reconsider only a few of the issues discussed under ' = 1.
When ' 6= 1, a positive productivity shock, say in the home country, improves its
current account and, hence, it generates a transfer of wealth in the form of bonds from the
23This is certainly true for most European countries, whose labour markets are generally characterized
by few trade unions as documented in Groth and Johansson (2002).
15foreign to the home country. The larger ' the larger the current account surplus, i.e. the
amount of ‘consumption switching’ that takes place. This type of output dispersion has
diﬀerent eﬀects on welfare than those produced by the dispersion of production within the
domestic economy. The former is an eﬃcient shift of production from the less productive
economy to the more productive economy. The latter is a reallocation due to ineﬃcient
price staggering.
Moreover, the more sensitive the demand for domestic goods to the terms of trade, the
stronger the eﬀect of diﬀerent inﬂation dynamics on the allocation of output among the
members of the currency area. This aﬀects welfare through equation (19).
Table (7) shows that welfare (measured in percentages of steady-state consumption)
and ' are linked by a non-monotonic relationship. For example, around ∆"W = 0 (i.e. the
benchmark case) intermediate values of ' yield greater welfare than values that are either
too small or too large. This reﬂects the complex way in which the terms of trade aﬀect
welfare and the dynamics of inﬂation. Table (8) shows that the value of ' has virtually no
eﬀect on the optimal policy in the symmetric currency area. This suggests that a precise
knowledge of this parameter is not crucial for the determination of the optimal response
to aggregate inﬂation.
Next we compare the performance, in terms of welfare, of the optimal interest rate
rule relative to the symmetric rule when competition and nominal rigidity diﬀer across
countries and ' 6= 1. For the sake of conciseness, we focus only on one special case, i.e.
' = 2, since this order of magnitude if often assumed in calibrated models (e.g. Backus
et al. (1994)).
Table (9) shows that the gains are smaller under ' = 2 than under the Cobb-Douglas
case. Now no more than 39% per quarter of steady-state consumption could be lost due
the use of the symmetric rule. Interestingly, the worst case for the symmetric rule occurs
under a large nominal-rigidity gap and a small competition gap. Under Cobb-Douglas
preferences such a scenario yielded a smaller loss.
Finally, Table (10) shows the optimal response coeﬃcient to the home producers’ price
inﬂation.24 Interestingly, even under an identical degree of competition across countries,
the central bank does not always ﬁnd it optimal to respond more aggressively to the
‘less ﬂexible’ country. In our particular example, a competition gap equal to or larger
than 2 calls for a rule that responds more aggressively to the more competitive country,
regardless of the degree nominal rigidity. The rationale behind this result was discussed in
the previous sections. The degree of nominal rigidity (as well as the degree of competition)
produces two counteracting eﬀects on welfare. One (negative) via the cost of inﬂation
(equation (26)) and the other (positive) via the Phillips curve (equation (27)). Larger
values of ' amplify the second eﬀect.
24Also in this case we maximize welfare with respect to both a and f1. The optimal value of a is not
qualitatively diﬀerent from that found under ' = 1.
167 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the relationship between monetary policy and two sources of
asymmetry across the members of a monetary union, in terms of the households’ welfare.
In particular, we have considered the implications of diﬀerent degrees of competition as
well as diﬀerent degrees of nominal rigidity.
Our focus has been on the problem of optimally weighting the country-speciﬁc com-
ponents of inﬂation in the design of an optimal interest rate rule. We have shown that,
in a dynamic model with staggered price setting, the degree of competition acquires a
second-best quality: less competition is associated with a smaller dispersion of output and,
hence, with greater welfare. In principle, this role of the degree of competition should be
taken into account by a welfare-maximizing central bank. When the central bank adopts
an interest rate rule that responds to the rate of inﬂation, the weights attached to the
country-speciﬁc components of inﬂation should increase in the degree of competition of
the relative countries.
Our study also extends the analysis of Benigno (2003) by showing that in the presence
of asymmetric degrees of competition, attaching a larger weight to the inﬂation of the ‘less
ﬂexible’ country might be suboptimal. If in reality the degree of nominal rigidity decreases
in the degree of competition, the relationship between the optimal weights and competition
(price rigidity) is ambiguous. Furthermore, we have shown that with non-Cobb-Douglas
preferences in home and foreign consumption, Benigno’s policy prescription becomes a
‘special’ case: it holds only under very small diﬀerences in the degree of competition and,
even in this case, only if the diﬀerences in the degree of nominal rigidity are not too large.
The welfare cost due to neglecting these asymmetries crucially depends on their actual
combination as well as on the degree of substitutability between domestic and imported
goods. In particular we show that the symmetric rule, i.e. the rule that neglects the
asymmetries, can outperform the optimal rule when the central bank has incomplete
information about the number and size of the asymmetries. Future research should look
at rules that are ‘robust’ to this type of uncertainty.
Finally, our work has focused on one particular source of shocks, i.e. productivity
shocks. Future research should look at whether our results would generally apply under
other types of shocks. This would be particularly important if the central bank had
incomplete information about the type of shocks as well as the type of asymmetries.
Appendix. Second-order approximations
A The non-stochastic steady-state allocation
In this section we derive the non-stochastic equilibrium allocation for the home country.
Similar relationships can be derived for the foreign country.
In the non-stochastic equilibrium AH = AF = 1. Moreover, ﬁrms set prices as a





















for country H and a similar expression for country F, where we have made use of the
labour demand implied by the production function (equation (13)) and the labour supply
equation (11) and where ΦH = sH¹H and CW
ss = nCss + (1 ¡ n)C¤
ss.















The steady state of the terms of trade can be derived by noting that in the steady
state households do not hold foreign bonds. Then PssCss = PH;ssYH;ss. Using the demand









































Equation (31) together with equations (30) and (34) provide the steady-state value of
foreign consumption.
B Second-order approximation of the aggregate price in-
dexes and inﬂation dynamics
Under Calvo contracts the domestic price index at time t is a weighted sum of the prices









18It is worth noting that the ﬁrst-order approximation of equation (35) yields, after few
rearrangements
!j
1 ¡ !j ˆ ¼j = ˆ pt ¡ ˆ Pj;t (36)
where ˆ x = log(xxss). By taking the second-order expansion of equation (35), in devia-
tion from the steady state, we obtain
ˆ PH;t = !H ˆ PH;t¡1 + (1 ¡ !H)ˆ pi;t +
!H
2
(1 ¡ !H)(1 ¡ "H)
³
ˆ pi;t ¡ ˆ PH;t¡1
´2
+ O(k»k3)










where we have used equation (36).
Inﬂation (say for the home producer price index) is simply given by ˆ ¼H
t = ˆ PH;t¡ ˆ PH;t¡1,
so that we can derive the ﬁrm i-th relative price as shown in equation (24).
Similarly, a second-order expansion of the price index (4) yields
ˆ Pt =
nPH;t + (1 ¡ n)T
(1¡')
ss PF;t

















ˆ PH;t ¡ ˆ PF;t
´2
+ O(k»k3): (38)
C Second-order approximation of Calvo prices

















where q1;s;t = ¯ Rs;t Ás Ã
³+1
1¡®
s , q2;s;t = ¯ Rs;tP¡1
s Ãs and where Á is the part of the marginal
cost that is independent of the ﬁrm’s output and Ã is the part of the demand for the
ﬁrm’s output that is independent of the ﬁrm’s price. One can see that q1;s;t+1 = Rt q1;s;t.
Therefore we can rewrite equations (40) and (41) as Qj;t = qj;t + !HEtR¡1
t Qj;t+1 or
RtQj;t = Rtqj;t;t + !HEtQj;t+1, where j = 1;2.
The second-order expansion of equations (40) and (41) then yields
19ˆ Qj;t + 1
2
³






ˆ qj;t;t + 1
2
³
ˆ qj;t;t + ˆ Rt
´2¶
¡ !H¯ ˆ Rt
+!H¯Et
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where we have omitted the linear and quadratic terms in the gross interest rate since,
eventually, they will cancel out in the determination of the ﬁrm’s optimal price. The
optimal price of the ﬁrm as written in equation (39) is linear in logs, so that we have, say
for the home country
³
1 + "H ®+³
1¡®
´
ˆ pi;t = ˆ Q1;t ¡ ˆ Q2;t.
It is convenient to look at equation (42) also up to its ﬁrst order of approximation. By
dropping the second-order term we can write




(q1;t;t ¡ q2;t;t) + !H¯Et
³








By using equation (39) and by subtracting ˆ PH;t on both sides of equation (43) we have
ˆ ¼H






















"H ˆ PH;t + '·3 ˆ Tt + ˆ CW
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, and where Át depends only on aggregate consumption and the
domestic productivity shock.
By adding and subtracting ˆ PH;t to the right side of equation (45) we obtain
ˆ q1;t;t ¡ ˆ q2;t;t =
µ
1 + "H ³ + ®
1 ¡ ®
¶












Finally, by replacing equation (46) into equation (44), we obtain equation (27)
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23∆"W -3 -1.5 0 1.5 3 4.5 6
a 4.11 5.52 6.93 8.35 9.76 11.19 12.6
Welfare (c%) 88.41 87.88 87.44 87.05 86.7 86.37 86.05
Table 1: Competition, monetary policy and welfare: The symmetric case.
1 ¡ ®
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0 83.54 86.31 88.33 89.84 91 91.92
2 83.54 86.31 88.32 89.83 91 91.92
²R 4 83.5 86.28 88.3 89.81 90.98 91.9
6 83.45 86.23 88.26 89.78 90.95 91.87
8 83.4 86.2 88.23 89.76 90.93 91.86
Table 2: Welfare under the symmetric rule v. "R and 1 ¡ ®.
!R
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0 87.44 87.62 88.14 88.93 89.89
2 87.48 87.63 88.12 88.91 89.87
"R 4 87.59 87.71 88.16 88.92 89.88
6 87.79 87.87 88.27 88.98 89.91
8 88.09 88.14 88.48 89.12 89.98
Table 3: Welfare under the optimal interest rate rule v. the two asymmetries.
!R
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.67
2 0.41 0.46 0.52 0.58 0.6
"R 4 0.33 0.37 0.43 0.5 0.52
6 0.25 0.29 0.34 0.4 0.42
8 0.19 0.21 0.24 0.29 0.3
Table 4: Optimal weight on home inﬂation (f1) and the two gaps.
24!R
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0 0 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.29
2 0 -0.04 -0.02 0.04 0.23
"R 4 0 -0.09 -0.11 -0.03 0.18
6 0 -0.15 -0.22 -0.11 0.13
8 0 -0.22 -0.34 -0.22 0.08
Table 5: Welfare gains from optimizing under incomplete information.
!R
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0 0 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.29
2 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.23
"R 4 0.2 0.11 0.05 0.06 0.2
6 0.46 0.31 0.17 0.11 0.19
8 0.8 0.63 0.4 0.22 0.21
Table 6: Welfare gains from optimally responding to inﬂation.
∆"W
-3 -1.5 0 1.5 3 4.5 6
1 88.41 87.88 87.44 87.05 86.7 86.37 86.05
3 88.29 88.04 87.87 87.74 87.61 87.5 87.38
' 5 88 87.8 87.7 87.62 87.57 87.52 87.47
7 87.78 87.6 87.51 87.47 87.44 87.42 87.4
Table 7: Optimal welfare in the symmetric currency area v. ' and "W.
∆"W
-3 -1.5 0 1.5 3 4.5 6
1 4.11 5.52 6.93 8.35 9.76 11.18 12.59
'
7 4.11 5.52 6.93 8.35 9.76 11.18 12.6
Table 8: Optimal response (a) to aggregate inﬂation in the symmetric currency area v. '
and ∆"W.
25!R
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0 0 0 0.02 0.09 0.39
2 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.33
"R 4 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.11 0.28
6 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.27
8 0.32 0.32 0.28 0.25 0.27
Table 9: Gains from the optimal rule when ' = 2.
!R
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0 0.5 0.51 0.53 0.53 0.47
2 0.42 0.43 0.45 0.46 0.4
"R 4 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.37 0.31
6 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.21
8 0.22 0.21 0.2 0.18 0.09
Table 10: The optimal weight f1 when ' = 2.
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